Como 4-1 Manchester United Champions League Tactical Breakdown

Manchester United arrived at Lake Como winless in six, beaten 2-0 in Madrid last week in the Champions League and held 1-1 at Leeds, with Michael Carrick under growing pressure. Cesc Fàbregas’ Como, fifth in Serie A after the highest finish in their history last season, were facing English opposition for the first time. It turned into a lesson in structure, and by the end, an open disagreement about whose plan it was.

Como 4-1 Manchester United scorecard graphic

Two Thin Squads, Two Similar Shapes

Cesc Fàbregas started with a 4-2-3-1, his hand forced by injuries to Assane Diao and Jesús Rodríguez, and on paper there were effectively three holding midfielders in his starting XI, Álex Milla, Máximo Perrone and Lucas Da Cunha, with Nico Paz and Martin Baturina ahead of them. That left Nikolaos Douvikas as really the only pure, out-and-out attacker and goalscorer on the pitch for Como.

Manchester United looked very similar. Mason Mount started, with Bryan Mbeumo and Matheus Cunha likely the furthest forward, and Mount, Bruno Fernandes, Youri Tielemans and Andrey Santos in midfield, Carlos Baleba dropping to the bench after the Leeds game. Michael Carrick had Matthijs de Ligt back, with Noussair Mazraoui, a right-back by trade, at left-back and Diogo Dalot on the right, and we were likely to see a similar game plan to the one at Leeds.

Neither bench offered much depth in terms of quality. For United, the only senior options were Baleba, Amad Diallo, Joshua Zirkzee and the two reserve goalkeepers, Tom Heaton and Karl Darlow, with the rest drawn from the academy. Razor-thin for both sides, and set to be an interesting contest.

Paz Strikes Early

It took Como two minutes to go ahead. Nico Paz picked up the ball on the edge of the 18-yard box and, with both United centre-backs dropping off and giving him the space, curled it into the top corner with his left foot for 1-0.

United couldn’t break Como’s first line of pressure and progress in the opening stages. Fàbregas wanted his defensive line to push up high with the rest of the unit when they pressed, but the key was his midfield. Three holding midfielders on paper, they had to trade markers when United’s midfielders drifted, pick up the spare men, and drop into the back line, so the defence could stay compact together in transition and Mbeumo and Cunha were never left with 1v1s or fast breaks against too few bodies. That was how Fàbregas hoped to find the balance between the high press and the mid-block.

When Douvikas or Paz pressed, the defensive line joined in and compressed the space between the lines, but the centre-backs didn’t need to step out, because the midfield protection in front of them was doing that job. In the final third, Valle gave width on the left much like a winger would, and Da Cunha did the same on the right, again despite being a holding midfielder. But it didn’t really matter, as the whole Como team have exceptional ball control and passing technique in tight areas, keeping the rhythm to their attacking no matter who is where on the pitch, as long as the positional structure holds. Out of possession, United didn’t yet have the measure of Como’s movements.

Manchester United’s Broken Press

Bruno Fernandes was Carrick’s choice for the central threat and the furthest-forward presser, initiating a ball-side press that the midfield and defenders behind him didn’t fully follow through on, which opened up midfield space for Como to progress unchallenged on several occasions. The idea, by the looks of it, was to force Como into long balls, win the duels further down the pitch and attack from there.

One of the main problems in this game, which was fundamental, was the understanding between United’s players of who they trade off to when they need to press, and when to hold a cover shadow as the ball moves and Como’s shape changes in the progression phase. What happened as a result was midfield space opening up behind a late or misguided Tielemans, Santos or Mount, and the defence didn’t push up with them to compress it, too worried about conceding 40-plus yards in behind. For most of the first half, United’s high press on Como’s build-up from set plays was broken.

In possession, with no centre-forward on the pitch, United made little to no runs in behind the Como defence to stretch the back line, so the Como defenders never had a second thought about whether to push up and press or stay with their man. United simply weren’t giving them that dilemma.

Como did have the threat of Douvikas, though. Whenever United’s pressure stalled and they sat in their mid-block, or dropped late as Como built up because their trigger references were murky and uncoordinated, Douvikas’ runs between or wide of the centre-backs became the primary threat, in a Como side with no traditional wide attacker.

Harry Maguire fired wide from United’s best chance on 17 minutes, Douvikas went close at the other end on 39, and it was 1-0 to Como at the break.

The Vacuum Gets Punished

Carrick sent on Amad Diallo and Carlos Baleba for Andrey Santos and Cunha at half-time, but the problems still remained, and the spatial vacuum between United’s defence and their press was punished even more after the break. A lack of tracking runners, missed trades between markers and open-shaped stances while the ball was in circulation kept inviting line-breaking passes, and Como took full advantage.

Four minutes after the restart, Paz slipped Douvikas in and the Como striker ran away from De Ligt to make it 2-0. On 57 minutes Baleba turned carelessly in his own half with no cover behind him, and Paz raced through for his second. Jacobo Ramón headed in the fourth on 76 minutes to finish a sweeping Como move, and Joshua Zirkzee’s stoppage-time finish from Amad’s cross was nothing more than a consolation.

Whose Plan Was It?

Bruno Fernandes didn’t hide where he thought the problem lay. “It’s a decision from the staff to not press man-to-man and sometimes leave a little bit of space in behind,” he told TNT Sports. “Sometimes you have to be more brave under pressure, trying to take a risk of pressing high and making them uncomfortable.” Asked whether Carrick had got the tactics wrong, he said: “That’s on the manager and on the staff to see, it is not me.”

It fits exactly with what happened on the pitch. Bruno led a ball-side oriented press that the rest of the team didn’t follow, and a defence instructed not to leave space in behind wouldn’t step up to compress the gap it created. A press without full commitment and a back line that won’t push up leaves exactly the spatial vacuum Como played through all night.

Carrick saw it differently. “We actually half-pressed man-to-man the second half and then conceded a goal from that,” he said, adding that “if you don’t run, and you don’t run forward, and you don’t run back, you ain’t going to win.” He apologised to the travelling fans for a performance he called “unacceptable”, and said: “I 100 percent take responsibility for the overall team and the performance.”

Fàbregas, meanwhile, was keeping his feet on the ground. “The team played well this evening, but we need to keep our feet on the ground,” he said. “Winning this way is very satisfying. It doesn’t matter if they are struggling at the moment.”

Verdict on Como & Manchester United

Como won this game with a clear idea of how to balance a high press and a mid-block, three holding midfielders trading markers and dropping into the back line so the defence never had to step out. United perhaps had a press plan on paper, but no shared understanding of who covers what when the ball moves, and no centre-forward to stretch the game the other way.

Now the captain has said publicly that the plan wasn’t brave enough, and the manager has said the players didn’t run. Seven games without a win, Bournemouth at home on Sunday, and a dressing room and dugout telling two different stories. How long can that last at Old Trafford?

CLICK the link below for more articles like this…

Tactics


Subscribe to my newsletter

Leave a Reply

Keep reading

Latest Breakdowns

Discover more from The Football Analyst

Subscribe now to keep reading and get access to the full archive.

Continue reading